000			03581cam a2200433 a 4500
999			_c5386 _d5386
001			ocn743040521
003			OCoLC
005			20200305175852.0
008			110720s2012 nju b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2011030845
015			_aGBB212142 _2bnb
020			_a9780691152936 _q(pbk. ; _qalk. paper)
020			_a0691152934 _q(pbk. ; _qalk. paper)
035			_a(OCoLC)743040521
037			_bPrinceton Univ Pr, California Princeton Fulfillment Center 1445 Lower Ferry rd, Ewing, NJ, USA, 08618 _nSAN 630-639X
040			_aDLC _beng _cTZ-ArACH
042			_apcc
043			_an-us---
049			_aTZAA
050	0	0	_aKF8719 _b.C76 2012
055	1	8	_aKF8719 _b.C77 2012 _2kfmod
082	0	0	_a347.73/109 _223
100	1		_aCrowe, Justin, _d1981-
245	1	0	_aBuilding the judiciary : _blaw, courts, and the politics of institutional development / _cJustin Crowe.
260			_aPrinceton, N.J. : _bPrinceton University Press, _c2012.
300			_axiv, 295 pages ; _c24 cm.
490	1		_aPrinceton studies in American politics : historical, international, and comparative perspectives
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_aThe puzzle of judicial institution building -- The early republic : establishment -- Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy : reorganization -- The Civil War and reconstruction : empowerment -- The Gilded Age and the Progressive Era : restructuring -- The interwar and New Deal years : bureaucratization -- Modern America : specialization -- Judicial power in a political world.
520			_a"How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? Building the Judiciary uncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution-building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, Justin Crowe moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution-building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, Crowe develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. He both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, Crowe presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution-building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what--in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy--it achieved."--Page 4 of cover.
650		0	_aCourts _zUnited States _xHistory.
650		7	_aCourts. _2fast
651		7	_aUnited States. _2fast
651		7	_aUSA _2gnd
653			_aFederal courts
655		7	_aHistory. _2fast
830		0	_aPrinceton studies in American politics.
942			_2lcc _cBOOK