000			03015cam a2200445Ii 4500
999			_c5274 _d5274
001			ocn989692846
003			OCoLC
005			20200228115509.0
008			150915t20172015nyua b 001 0 eng d
015			_aGBB4A3948 _2bnb
020			_z9781107065727 _q(hardback)
020			_z1107065720 _q(hardback)
020			_a9781107677265 _q(paperback)
020			_a1107677262 _q(paperback)
035			_a(OCoLC)989692846
040			_aHVL _beng _erda _cTZ-ArACH
043			_ae------
049			_aTZAA
050		4	_aKZ6250 _b.C37 2017
082	0	4	_a340-349
100	1		_aCarrubba, Clifford J., _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aInternational courts and the performance of international agreements : _ba general theory with evidence from the European Union / _cClifford J. Carrubba, Matthew J. Gabel.
250			_aFirst paperback edition.
260			_aCambridge (UK): _bCambridge University Press; _c2017.
300			_aviii, 243 pages : _billustrations ; _c24 cm.
490	1		_aComparative constitutional law and policy
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references and index.
505	0		_a1. International courts and compliance -- 2. A theory of courts and compliance in international law -- 3. Putting the theory to the test: evaluating the hypotheses in the European Union -- 4. Preliminary considerations: designing a control for the legal merits -- 5. The political sensitivity hypothesis: third-party briefs and European Court of Justice rulings -- 6. The conditional effectiveness hypothesis: the European Court of Justice and economic integration -- 7. Conclusion.
520			_aNations often turn to international courts to help with overcoming collective-action problems associated with international relations. However, these courts generally cannot enforce their rulings, which begs the question: how effective are international courts? This book proposes a general theory of international courts that assumes a court has no direct power over national governments. Member states are free to ignore both the international agreement and the rulings by the court created to enforce that agreement. The theory demonstrates that such a court can, in fact, facilitate cooperation with international law, but only within important political constraints. The authors examine the theoretical argument in the context of the European Union. Using an original data set of rulings by the European Court of Justice, they find that the disposition of court rulings and government compliance with those rulings comport with the theory's predictions.--
650		0	_aInternational courts.
650		0	_aInternational relations.
650		7	_aDiplomatic relations. _2fast
650		7	_aInternational courts. _2fast
650		7	_aInternational relations. _2fast
651		0	_aEuropean Union countries _xForeign relations. _914244
651		7	_aEurope _zEuropean Union countries. _2fast
700	1		_aGabel, Matthew J., _eauthor.
830		0	_aComparative constitutional law and policy.
942			_2lcc _cBOOK