000			03401cam a2200541 i 4500
999			_c4850 _d4850
001			ocn891718803
003			OCoLC
005			20180704104008.0
008			140925s2015 miua b 001 0 eng
010			_a 2014038351
020			_a9780472072606 _q(hardcover ; _qalk. paper)
020			_a0472072609 _q(hardcover ; _qalk. paper)
020			_a9780472052608 _q(pbk. ; _qalk. paper)
020			_a0472052608 _q(pbk. ; _qalk. paper)
020			_z9780472121014 _q(e-book)
020			_z0472121014
029	1		_aAU@ _b000053682681
029	1		_aNLGGC _b400230631
035			_a(OCoLC)891718803 _z(OCoLC)915751692
037			_bUniv of Michigan Pr, C/O Perseus Distribution 1094 Flex Dr, Jackson, TN, USA, 38301 _nSAN 631-760X
040			_aDLC _beng _erda _cDLC _dYDX _dBDX
042			_apcc
049			_aTZAA
050	0	0	_aKZ6250 _b.J64 2015
082	0	0	_a341.5/5 _223
100	1		_aJohns, Leslie Nicole, _d1979- _eauthor.
245	1	0	_aStrengthening international courts : _bthe hidden costs of legalization / _cLeslie Johns.
260			_aAnn Arbor : _bUniversity of Michigan Press, _c2015
300			_ax, 230 pages : _billustrations ; _c24 cm.
490	1		_aMichigan studies in international political economy
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 211-223) and index.
505	0		_aRational institutions and international law -- Theoretical argument -- Strengthening the international court of justice -- Strengthening the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system -- Designing international courts.
520			_aAs all manner of commerce becomes increasingly global, states must establish laws to protect property rights, human rights, and national security. In many cases, states delegate authority to resolve disputes regarding these laws to an independent court, whose power depends upon its ability to enforce its rulings. Examining detailed case studies of the International Court of Justice and the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to the World Trade Organization, Leslie Johns finds that a court's design has nuanced and mixed effects on international cooperation. A strong court is ideal when laws are precise and the court is nested within a political structure like the European Union. Strong courts encourage litigation but make states more likely to comply with agreements when compliance is easy and withdraw from agreements when it is difficult. A weak court is optimal when law is imprecise and states can easily exit agreements with minimal political or economic repercussions. Johns concludes the book with recommendations for promoting cooperation by creating more precise international laws and increasing both delegation and obligation to international courts.--
610	2	0	_aGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization)
610	2	0	_aWorld Trade Organization. _95143
610	2	7	_aGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Organization) _2fast
610	2	7	_aWorld Trade Organization. _2fast _95143
650		0	_aInternational courts.
650		0	_aInternational law.
650		0	_aDispute resolution (Law)
650		0	_aJudgments, Foreign.
650		7	_aDispute resolution (Law) _2fast
650		7	_aInternational courts. _2fast
650		7	_aInternational law. _2fast
650		7	_aJudgments, Foreign. _2fast
830		0	_aMichigan studies in international political economy.
942			_2lcc _cBOOK